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Abstract
The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem states that if labor is weakly separable from goods
in household utility functions, diﬀerential commodity taxation should not be not
part of an optimal redistributive tax system. This Theorem, which is arguably
the most policy-relevant result to come out of the optimal income tax literature,
has come under considerable scrutiny in the literature. We consider how robust
it is with respect to diﬀerences in needs or endowments of goods, more than one
type of labor supply, diﬀerences in preference for leisure, and restrictions on policy
instruments.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H2
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  Prepared for the Festschrift in Honor of Joe Stiglitz.1. Introduction
One of the oldest controversies in tax theory involves the choice between direct and
indirect taxation, in particular the issue of when diﬀerential commodity taxes are
not a component of the optimal tax system. The early literature focussed on the
eﬃciency role of commodity taxes: under what circumstances would the Ramsey
tax system applied to a given household consist of a uniform tax on commodities, or
equivalently a tax on income? The famous Corlett and Hague (1953-54) Theorem
settled that. If all goods are ‘equally substitutable’ for leisure, diﬀerential commod-
ity taxes should not be used. Otherwise, goods that are more complementary with
leisure should bear higher commodity tax rates. As explained in Sandmo (1976), a
utility function in which goods are separable from leisure, and which is homothetic
in goods satisﬁes this property. This result, although an important methodological
innovation, is of limited interest from a policy point of view since it abstracts from
the redistributive role that the tax system plays.
The question of when diﬀerential commodity taxes should be used alongside
a progressive income tax as part of a redistributive tax system was addressed in
a well-known paper by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Their result, the Atkinson-
Stiglitz (A-S) Separability Theorem, has been seminal and has spawned a substantial
literature.1 Roughly speaking, the A-S Theorem states that if household utility
functions are separable in goods and leisure, diﬀerential commodity taxes should
not be used. This result is arguably the most relevant result for policy purposes to
emerge from the optimal income tax literature initiated by Mirrlees (1971). It has
been subject to considerable scrutiny in the literature, and special attention has
been devoted to the circumstances in which it is violated and what it implies for
the structure of commodity taxes. Interestingly, the analogue of the Corlett-Hague
Theorem applies, albeit for diﬀerent reasons. As shown by Edwards et al (1994)
and Nava et al (1996), if weak separability is violated, higher tax rates should apply
to goods that are relatively more complementary with leisure.
Our purpose in this paper is to revisit the A-S Theorem. We explore the
1robustness of the theorem to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of household utility, of govern-
ment information and of restrictions on policy instruments. We begin with a simple
derivation of the A-S result, using a methodology that will be useful in synthesizing
the various extensions. We then turn to those extensions, ﬁrst focusing on the case
where an optimal non-linear tax is in place, and then turning to the case where the
government is restricted to a linear progressive tax.
The A-S Theorem
In this section, we adopt a simpliﬁed version of the model used by Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976), retaining their essential assumptions. For simplicity, we assume that
there are two types of households who diﬀer only in their wage rates wi (i =1 ,2),
where w2 >w 1.T h e r ea r eni households of type i. We assume that their are only
two goods, denoted x and z, along with labor  , and that households have identical
weakly separable utility functions of the form u(g (x,z), ).2 The utility function
is strictly concave, and both goods as well as leisure are normal. The market (pre-
tax) income of a type-i household is yi ≡ wi i. Following Guesnerie (1995), the
government is assumed to be able to observe household incomes as well as anony-
mous transactions in the goods market. It can therefore implement a non-linear
income tax as well as proportional commodity taxes.3 As is well-known, only the
structure of commodity taxes, and not their level, constitutes an independent policy
instrument: proportional commodity taxes can be replicated by an appropriate ad-
justment in the income tax schedule. Therefore, we can normalize the commodity
tax rate on good x to be zero, and treat the tax rate on z as the policy instrument
reﬂecting the diﬀerential commodity tax structure. Let t be the per unit tax on
purchases of good z.I ft = 0 in the optimum, the redistributive objectives of gov-
ernment can be achieved by an income tax alone. Goods prices are normalized to
unity, and we deﬁne the consumer price of good z tobe q ≡ 1+t.
To facilitate our analysis, we disaggregate household decision-making into two
stages.4 In the ﬁrst stage, the household chooses labor supply, earns income, pays
2income taxes, and ends up with disposable income. In the second stage, disposable
income is allocated between the two goods. Consider the second stage ﬁrst. Let ci
be disposable income, where ci = xi + qzi. Given the separable utility function, a
household of type i solves the following problem:
max
{zi}
g(ci − qzi,z i)
where ci and q are given. From the ﬁrst-order conditions, gi
z/gi
x = q,5 we obtain







In the ﬁrst stage, the household chooses labor supply, given the income tax
chosen by the government and the anticipated outcome of stage 2. Eﬀectively, the
household is choosing earned income yi and, via the income tax, ci. For this stage,
we follow the standard procedure of optimal income tax analysis initiated by Stiglitz
(1982) of allowing the government to chooseyi and ci implicitly by its choice of an
income tax schedule. Individual utility functions are reformulated in terms of what







≡ u(h(q,ci),  i)
The government is assumed to maximize a utilitarian objective function, al-
though any quasi-concave function in individuals utilities would give the same re-
sults. The Lagrange expression for the optimal income and commodity tax problem































The ﬁrst constraint reﬂects the government budget constraint, and assumes no
net revenue requirement. The second constraint is the incentive constraint and
3reﬂects the fact that this will only be binding for type-2 households. The Lagrange
multipliers associated with the two constraints are λ and γ, respectively.
The relevant ﬁrst-order conditions for our purposes are those with respect to























































=0 ( 3 )
where the ‘hat’ refers to a type-2 household who is mimicking a type-1. Multiplying













c (z1 −  z2)=0 ( 4 )
where we have used the envelope condition on q from the second-stage of the house-
hold’s problem, hi
q+gi
xzi = 0, which also applies to the mimicking type-2 household.
The function  zi (q) represents the compensated demand for zi, where the compen-
sation takes the form of disposable income. The second equality follows from the
fact that type-1 households and the mimicking type-2 households have the same
disposable income c1, but diﬀer in their labor supplies. By separability, they will
consume the same bundle of goods, so  z2 = z1. Therefore, when the income tax is
being set optimally, t = 0, sonodiﬀerential co mmo dities taxes sho uld be applied.
This demonstrates the A-S Theorem.7
Next we turn to two sorts of extensions to the above analysis. In the ﬁrst,
taken up in the following section, we modify the manner in which goods enter the
subutility function g(x,z) by allowing households to have diﬀerent basic needs or,
equivalently, diﬀerent endowments of one of the goods. In the subsequent section,
we consider diﬀerent speciﬁcation for labor supply.
43. Needs and Endowments
Suppose, in the manner of the Stone-Geary utility function, that households have
some basic non-discretionary expenditures that must be made on one of the goods,
say, z. The separable utility function can then be written u(g(x,z − b), ), where
b is non-discretionary expenditures on z. One interpretation that can be given to
b, following Rowe and Woolley (1999), is that of a basic need for good z,s u c h
as sustenance, health spending, etc. Alternatively, b might be interpreted as an
initial endowment, as in Cremer et al (2001), in which case it takes a negative
value.8 The only diﬀerence between the two approaches is that in case of initial
endowments, these enter the overall resource constraint of the economy by adding
to net output. Note that b might enter into the utility function in other ways, such
as multiplicative. Since this would not aﬀect our basic results, the additive form is
adopted for simplicity. Note also that there may be a needs parameter associated
with good x as well. Since the same analysis would apply to this case, we analyze
only the case of non-discretionary expenditures in good z.9
If b were the same for all persons, it would obviously have no eﬀect on the A-S
Theorem derived in the previous section. The non-discretionary expenditures would
simply be an element of the common utility function faced by all households, which
would remain separable. Instead, we assume that b can diﬀer across households. For
expositional purposes, we assume that b c a nt a k eont w o v a l u e s bj, j =1 ,2. This
implies that, in principle, there can now be four household types, {wi,b j}, i,j =
1,2. In analyzing government policy, two informational settings are considered.
In one, following Cremer et al (2001), the government can able observe neither w
nor b. This is consistent with interpreting b as an endowment. In the other, the
government can observe b, but not w. This is the assumption adopted by Rowe and
Woolley (1999) in their analysis of needs. We consider these two cases in turn.
3.1 Government Does Not Observe Needs
With both w and b unobservable, the government faces a two-dimensional screening
5problem. This is the case analyzed by Cremer et al (2001). As is well-known, the
analysis is complex and the results ambiguous, mainly because the direction in
which the self-selection constraints bind is no longer unambiguous. We can simplify
the analysis considerably without aﬀecting the main results by assuming that each
ability-type is associated with a given need type. Thus, a household of type wi has
a need of bi. This leaves us with at most one binding self-selection constraint which,
unlike in the previous section, can bind in either direction even under a utilitarian
objective function. For example, if high-wage households also have high needs, the
government may want to redistribute from the low-wage to the high-wage types.
But for our purposes, that does not aﬀect the results. Therefore, we proceed by
assuming that the self-selection constraint applies downwards as in the previous
section.
As before, we can proceed in a two-stage manner, assuming that in the ﬁrst
stage, labor supply and income are chosen, while in the second stage, disposable
income is allocated between the two goods. The analysis of the second stage is
identical toearlier. A type- i household chooses zi tomaximize g (ci − qzi,z i − bi).
This yields the demand function z (q,ci,b i), and the value function h(q,ci,b i). The
envelope theorem again yields hi
q + gi
xzi =0 .
In the ﬁrst stage, the Lagrangean expression for the government’s choice of
{ci,y i,q} is exactly as before, and the ﬁrst-order conditions on ci and q can be used












c (z1 −  z2)( 5 )
Unlike in the previous section, the right-hand side is generally not zero: it will only
be soif b1 = b2. It can be shown that t>0i fb2 >b 1, and vice versa. That
is, if high-wage households also have higher needs, the tax on z should be higher
(assuming, of course, that the self-selection constraint on the high-wage types is
binding).
This result can be illustrated using Figure 1, which depicts preferences and
6the budget constraint for a type-1 person and a mimicking type-2. Deﬁne the net
(after-needs) consumption of good z by zi ≡ zi −bi. Then, the sub-utility function
for the two types of individuals is identical in x and z, and preferences over x and
z are independent of labor supply. When t = 0, the budget constraints for each
household are given by ci − bi = xi + zi. The ﬁgure shows the choices of xi and zi
for the two types of households when b2 >b 1. As can be seen, z1 −  z2 <b 2 − b1
(recall that the ‘hat’ refers tothe mimicker), which implies that  z2 >z 1.S i n c et h e
mimicker purchases more of good z, the self-selection constraint can be weakened
by imposing a tax on that good.
Quite clearly if instead we had the higher productivity workers having the
higher needs, the self-selection constraint could apply in the other direction. This
is surely the case when productivity diﬀerences are small and diﬀerences in needs
huge. Then, both t>0or < 0 are also possible. With four types, the pattern
of self-selection constraints becomes quite complex, but as shown by Cremer et al.
(2001) the case for a non-zero tax, positive or negative, is very strong.
The upshot of this discussion is that if persons have diﬀerent needs or endow-
ments, the A-S Theorem will fail to be satisﬁed even if the utility function is weakly
separable.
3.2 Government Observes Needs
Suppose now that the government can observe household needs bj, but it cannot
observe wage rates wi. There are now four household types, and we denote the
government’s policy instruments by{cij,y ij,q}, i,j =1 ,2. However, since needs are
now observable, the population can be divided into the two identiﬁable need types
{w1,b 1;w2,b 1} and {w1,b 2;w2,b 2}. The second stage of the household problem is
analogous to above, the only diﬀerence being that household demands and functions
are now indexed by ‘ij’ rather than simply i.
The government can now condition its policies on need, and that simpliﬁes
matters considerably. In particular, it need worry only about incentive compatibility





































































































It should be apparent that by combining these conditions, we obtain the analog


















c (z1j −  z2j)=0
The last equality comes about because within each need group j, a type-1 household
and a type-2 mimicker has the same disposable income and the same value of bj,s o
by separability, they have the same demand for good z,or z1j =  z2j. Therefore, the
A-S Theorem applies in this case. It ought also to be obvious that this result extends
to other formulations of need, such as multiplicative. Provided the government can
classify households by need, and utility functione are separable, the A-S Theorem
applies.
The optimal income tax system is obviously more complicated in this case,
since there is a diﬀerent schedule for each need type.
4. Multiple Forms of Labor
In this section, we consider the robustness of the A-S Theorem when household
labor supplies are disaggregated into more than one type. For simplicity, we assume
8that households can supply two types of labor, say  c and  d, whose interpretations
will be discussed for various cases considered below. As in the previous section,
the informational restrictions that face the government will be key in determining
whether the A-S Theorem applies.
4.1 Two Types of Market Labor
Suppose each household supplies two types of labor to the market, receives a wage
rate for each, and uses the proceeds to purchase goods. In this case, the utility
function becomes u(g(x,z),  c,  d). The two types of labor supply could be two
diﬀerent jobs, or the problem could be given an intertemporal interpretation, with
 c and  d interpreted as present and future labor supply (where x and z can then
be interpreted as present and future consumption). In this case, the applicability of
the A-S Theorem depends on whether or not incomes from the two forms of labor
supply yc and yd are observable.
If both yc and yd are observable either individually or in the aggregate, the
analysis of Section 2 goes through with virtually no modiﬁcation. The govern-
ment’s selection of an optimal tax policy involves selecting consumption levels and
disposable incomes for the two types of households, as well as the commodity tax
on z. The conditions on ci and q are the same as before. Moreover, since the mim-
icker has the same disposable income as a type-1 person, separability ensures that
 z2 = z1, so the optimal commodity tax rate is zero (t =0 ) .
On the other hand, suppose that, say, yc is observable, but yd is not. This
might correspond with the case in which labor supply  d is tothe undergro und
economy, as in Boadway et al (1994). Of course, for this interpretation to apply,
one ought to model explicitly the penalty and detection technologies associated with
the underground sector. However, that would serve only to complicate the story
without aﬀecting the main result. That result is that the A-S Theorem generally
no longer applies if one source of income is not observable to the government.
The intuition is straightforward, even without a formal analysis. If only yc is
9observable, the government can control only that part of disposable income that
comes from  c. Assuming that the wage rate of the mimicker is higher that that
of a type-1 household in the unobserved sector, it will generally be the case that
 yd2  = yd1. That implies that  c2  = c1, sothat even with separable preferences,
 z2  = z1.S o,f ore x a m p l e ,i f  yd2 >y d1 because of the higher productivity of a type-2
person,  z2 >z 1, and it will be optimal to impose a tax on good z.
More generally, suppose the subutility function g(x,z)i sh om ot h e t i c .I nt h i s
case, the proportions in which the two goods are consumed by the two persons
will be the same. Even in this case it will be optimal to tax good z. In fact, as
Boadway et al (1994) show, the optimal commodity tax system is a proportional one
on the two goods x and z. The point is that in the absence of full observability of
income, a proportional income tax is no longer a perfect substitute for a proportional
commodity tax. In the optimum, there needs to be a mix of the two taxes.
4.2 Household Production
Suppose that the second form of labor supply  d represents non-market or household
production with no disposable income that can be used to purchase x and z.A l l
disposable income comes from yc, which is observed by the government. Assume
that the utility function still takes the form u(g(x,z),  c,  d), where the argument
 d incorporates both the disutility of the non-market work as well as the the product
of that work. In this case, the A-S Theorem still holds regardless of whether non-
market labor is observed by the government. Indeed if all households share the
same preferences, that will not be relevant.
The analysis is a straightforward application of that used in Section 2. The
government controls yc, and therefore disposable income that is used to purchase
x and z. The existence of non-market labor complicates things slightly because
it conditions the structure of the optimal non-linear income tax, and might in
principle aﬀect the direction in which the incentive constraint is binding. Suppose,
for example, that the self-selection constraint is binding on type-2 households in
10the optimum. Households of type 2 who mimick those of type 1 will earn the same
market income yc1 and obtain the same disposable income c1. By the same analysis
as above,  z2 = z1,a n ds ot = 0 in the optimum. This logic still applies if the
self-selection constraint binds on type-1 households.
4.3 Diﬀerent Preferences for Leisure
Household might diﬀer not only by ability but according to their preferences for
leisure. This adds another important and diﬃcult dimension to redistributive policy.
For one thing, governments are unlikely to be able to diﬀerentiate persons according
to their preferences for leisure, that is, their laziness or diligence. For another, even
if they could, it is not obvious how redistributive policies ought to diﬀerentiate
among preference types. There is a school of thought that suggests that households
are responsible for their own preferences, and redistributive policies ought only to
compensate for ability diﬀerences.10 On the other hand, as stressed by Cuﬀ (2000),
preferences for leisure might be viewed as being partly determined by not just one’s
attitude towo rk, but alsotothe degree o f diﬃculty individuals face.
Consider the simple case in which there are two ability-types of households
and two preference types. A convenient way to formulate the utility function when
there are diﬀerences in preferences is as u(g (x,z),α ).11 In this formulation, α
c a nt a k eont h ev a l u e s α1 and α2.I f α1 >α 2, preference type-1 has a greater
preference for leisure than preference type-2 households. In the unlikely event that
the government could distinguish between high and low preference for leisure types,
it could simply design two separate non-linear income tax systems for the two types,
exactly analogously to the case of diﬀerent needs for goods considered earlier. In
this case, it is obvious that the A-S Theorem applies, since within each preference
type, the high-wage mimicking person would have the same disposable income as
the low-wage person, and by separability would consume the same bundle of goods.
If the government cannot distinguish preference types, it is again faced with
a two-dimensional screening problem. Depending on the relative welfare weights
11attached to the two preference types, the pattern of binding self-selection constraints
can vary (cf. Boadway et al, 2001). However, regardless of what the pattern
might be in the optimum, the separability of the utility function combined with
the commonality of the sub-utility function g (x,z) implies that the A-S Theorem
still holds. Mimickers will have the same income and disposable income as those
they are mimicking regardless of the type of either. Therefore, they will consume
the same bundle of goods, implying that a diﬀerential commodity tax cannot be
used toseparate the twotypes. Diﬀerences in preferences fo r leisure merely serve
to complicate the form of the optimal non-linear income tax.
Finally, note that diﬀerences in preference for leisure could reﬂect diﬀerences in
need, analogous to the case of diﬀerences of need for diﬀerent goods. For example,
utility functions might take the form u(g (x,z), + a), where a reﬂects need and
can vary from one household to another. By similar reasoning to above, the A-S
Theorem continues to apply in this case regardless of whether the government can
observe household needs.
4.4 Becker-Gronau Household Production
A ﬁnal case to consider is the case where consumption of goods itself requires
the allocation of some time, following Becker (1965), Gronau (1977) and Jacob-
sen Kleven (2000). One way of formulating the utility function in this case is as
u(g (X,Z), ), where X and Z are commodities produced by household production
functions fx (x, x)a n dfz (z, z), where  x and  z are labor inputs into the produc-
tion of the home-produced commodities. Assuming that the household production
functions are the same for both households, the A-S Theorem applies directly. Mim-
icking households will have the same income and disposable incomes of those being
mimicked, and given these assumptions will purchase the same quantities of the two
goods x and z to produced the same quantities of household goods. On the other
hand, if the households had diﬀerent productivities in home production, which
might be a reasonable assumption, the same disposable incomes would generally
12give rise todiﬀerent demands fo r x and z by mimicking type-2’s and type-1’s.
5. Restricted Instruments: Linear Income Taxation
Up to now we have assumed that there was no restriction on the income tax schedule.
Yet there are a number of reasons for not having an unrestricted non-linear income
tax. To illustrate one type of restriction, we consider commodity taxation in a
model where there is an optimal linear income tax. Our approach allows us to
characterize clearly the restrictions on the utility function that will be suﬃcient to
rule out diﬀerential commodity taxation. For this purpose, we revert to the basic
model in which all consumers have identical utility functions, now speciﬁed to take
the general form u(x,z, ). We retain the commodity tax on z and now introduce a
uniform lump-sum subsidy T and a constant marginal income tax m applicable to
all households.
The household’s problem is to maximize u(x,z, ) subject tothe budget co n-
straint x+qz = ω +T,w h e r eω =( 1−m)w is the after-tax wage rate. Maximizing
u(ω +T −qz,z, ) leads tothe demand functio ns z(ω,q,T)a n d (ω,q,T), and the
indirect utility v(ω,q,T)w i t h
vT = ux; vω = ux  and vq = −uxz
The government’s revenue constraint is now simply:

ni[(wi − ωi) i(·) − T +( q − 1)zi(·)] ≥ 0
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These three ﬁrst-order conditions can be combined by the following operations:
(T) ·

niwi i +( m)a n d( T) ·

nizi +( m)t oy i e l d :








































It is generally speciﬁed that bi is negatively correlated with gross earnings wi i.
From the ﬁrst-order condition (T),










This is the standard formula for the optimal linear income tax rate, with the equity
term in the numerator and the eﬃciency term in the denominator.




i∂˜  i/∂ωi is proportional to cov(bi,z i)+m

niwi∂˜  i/∂q,t h e nt =0 . I t
can be shown that this will be the case when goods are separable from leisure in
the utility function, and the subutility function g(x,z) is quasi-homothetic; that is,
Engel curves relating goods consumption and disposable income are linear.12
Proof:
Note ﬁrst that quasi-homotheticity makes the consumption of z a linear function of
w .
As well, quasi-homotheticity combined with separability make wi∂˜  i/∂ωi pro-
portional to ∂˜  i/∂q. To see this, consider the expenditure minimization problem of
the household, letting p be the price of x:
min
x,z, 
px + qz − ω  s.t.u (g(x,z), )   u
14This problem’s solution gives the compensated functions ˜ x(p,q,ω,u ), ˜ z(p,q,ω,u )
and ˜  (p,q,ω,u ), and the expenditure function e(p,q,ω,u ). The envelope theorem
then yields
ep =˜ x(p,q,ω,u ); eq =˜ z(p,q,ω,u ); eω = −˜  (p,q,ω,u )
Diﬀerentiating, we obtain:












; eωω = −
∂˜  
∂ω
Compensated demand functions, and therefore eω, are homogeneous of degree zero
in prices. Applying Euler’s Theorem, we have peωp + qeωq + ωeωω =0 . Using the











Because of separability, preferences over {x,z} are deﬁned by the sub-utility
function g(x,z), which is independent of  . A compensated increase in the wage
rate causes labour supply to rise. In turn, disposable income rises, and the budget
constraint in (x,z)–space moves parallel upward. By quasi-homotheticity, we have
that for any change in dispsable income, ∆˜ x/∆˜ z = k,w h e r ek is a constant that
depends on relative prices and is the same for all households. Therefore, for a






























15This implies that the factor of proportionality relating wi∂˜  i/∂ωi to ∂˜  i/∂q is the
same as the one relating cov(vi,w i,  i)t oc o v ( bi,z i). Therefore, t =0 .
This result can be seen as an adaptation of the A-S Theorem to a setting
in which there are restrictions on the structure of the income tax. By using the
same logic as before, diﬀerences in need and endowments for goods will have the
same eﬀect on the applicability this modiﬁed A-S Theorem, as in the A-S Theorem
under non-linear optimal income taxation. That is, if households have diﬀerent
unobservable needs for one of the goods, it will generally be desirable to impose
a tax or subsidy on it. On the other hand, if needs are observable, diﬀerent tax
schedules will apply to persons of diﬀerent needs classes. Similarly, if households
supply two types of labor, the modiﬁed A-S Theorem applies if both types are
observable, but not otherwise. As well, the modiﬁed version still applies if there is
unobserved household production or if preferences for leisure diﬀer.
6. Conclusions
When looking at real life tax systems one ﬁnds almost everywhere a mix of direct
and indirect taxes, or more precisely of consumption and income taxes. What are
the reasons for such an apparent violation of the A-S proposition? Ignorance of
basic public economics and thus bad ﬁscal engineering? Huge compliance costs in
income taxation relative to consumption taxation? Reasons developed in this paper
and elsewhere for inﬁrming the A-S proposition? Unwillingness to implement an
optimal income tax? Lack of separability of the utility function?
As usual the answer is ‘a bit of everything’. It is clear that in developing
countries, the compliance and administration costs of income taxation are so high
that tax authorities have to rely on friendlier indirect taxation. The arguments
developed above have also some empirical relevancy. For example, it is natural
to think that needs diﬀer across individuals and are not always observable. The
issue of separability is also far from being settled: most econometric studies do not
lend support to such separability. It is possible that some public ﬁnance experts
16and policy makers miss the point of A-S proposition and believe that taxes are like
eggs: you do not put them in the same basket as income taxation. Finally, there
is an issue with the willingness to implement an optimal income tax. The A-S
proposition assumes that one starts with such a tax. It is far from being granted
that existing income tax systems correspond to such a scheme, and without optimal
income taxation there is no AS proposition.
ENDNOTES
1. Cremer et al. (2001). See below Naito (1999) who shows that if production
consists of several sectors using in variable proportion the diﬀerent types of
workers, then it pays to tax the sectors employing a relatively high proportion
of skilled labor, Saez (2002) who shows that Naito’s objection disappears in the
long run, and Cremer and Gahvari (1995) who underline the desirable insurance
eﬀect of commodity taxation.
2. This assumption has been questioned on empirical grounds. See on this Chris-
tiansen (1984) and Browning and Meghir (1991).
3. Revesz (1986) has shown that if the government could levy license fees alongside
proportional commodity taxes, it might be optimal to do so even if optimal
proportional commodity tax rates are zero because of separability. In this
paper, we assume that license fees cannot be enforced because of the possibility
of resale.
4. A similar procedure has been used by Edwards et al (1994), Nava et al (1996),
and Cremer et al (2001).
5. In what follows, variables applying to households of type i are denoted by a sub-
script, while functions for household i are denoted by a superscript. Function
subscripts refer topartial derivatives.
6. The ﬁrst-order conditions on incomes yi can be used tocharacterize the struc-
ture of the optimal income tax. The characterization is standard, and we sup-
press it here. In what follows, the government is always taken to be applying
17the optimal income tax.
7. Note that  z2 >z 1 implies that the tax on z should be positive (using the
negativity of own substitution eﬀects). This corresponds with the case in which
z and leisure are complements: type-2 mimickers take more leisure than type-
1’s. See Edwards et al (1994) and Nava et al (1996).
8. An interpretation of unobserved endowments that gives rise to a rationale for
diﬀerential commodity taxation is the case of bequests, analysed in Boadway
et al (2000) and Cremer et al (2002). In this case, the analysis is intertempo-
ral, and the diﬀerential taxation applies to future versus present consumption.
These authors treat capital income taxation as the policy instrument for taxing
future consumption.
9. Diﬀerences in needs or endowments are similar to heterogeneous tastes. See on
this Saez (2000).
10. See, for example, Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999).
11. This is the formulation for the preferences for leisure used by Boadway et al
(2002), who study the design of the optimal redistributive income tax when
households diﬀer in both ability and preferences.
12. On this, see Deaton (1979).
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